Alfredo D'Attorre speaks out: "No more technicalities and broad agreements, never again will the Democratic Party be with Schlein."

Alfredo D'Attorre, Head of University and Research in the National Secretariat of the Democratic Party. For her positions on Israel and Palestine, as well as for supporting the five referendums, PD secretary Elly Schlein has been accused of pacifist maximalism and subservience to Landini, Conte, and Fratoianni. Are we back to "targeting the secretary "? The secretary deserves credit for repositioning the party on key issues with a series of courageous decisions, which have restored the PD's recognizable profile. After the last general election, the party was divided internally, isolated externally, plummeting in the polls, and, according to many observers, on the verge of implosion. Today, much work remains to be done, but we are in a completely different situation. The new PD still has a long way to go, but those nostalgic for the old PD are suffering from a certain denial of reality.

Why then so much criticism of the PD's new course? The awareness that there's no going back seems fairly well-established among the party's base, so much so that no one within the party is calling for the secretary to be replaced. Meanwhile, I feel there's more distress in certain external circles—economic, editorial, international, institutional—who had become accustomed to viewing the PD as a tool always ready to respond as soon as certain systemic triggers were triggered: the Monti government, the grand coalition after the 2013 elections, labor market reform during the Renzi government, the Draghi government, the breakdown of the alliance with the Five Star Movement before the last general election, to name a few. As long as this leadership exists, that attitude will not return: there will no longer be a PD willing to sacrifice coherence and social roots for legitimacy from above. The fundamental choice of this leadership is to attempt to govern through the legitimacy of the electorate, not through new grand coalitions. From this perspective, I understand the disorientation of those outsiders who find themselves dealing with a Democratic Party that has acquired full political autonomy and, on occasion, can respond with a resounding no.

Don't you think there's a need for an internal review of the political line? Discussion within the bodies is always positive, as is the democratic involvement of our members and voters in fundamental decisions. At a certain point, there will also be a new congress, in accordance with the Statute and in the format and timing we will decide together. What I sincerely don't understand is the position of those who don't question Schlein's leadership, but would like the secretary to pursue a political line opposite to the one they believe in and on which she was elected. The PD congress doesn't elect a person responsible for organizing or leading political initiatives, who dedicates himself to organizing a few local campaigns, while the "adults," the "wise," and the "competent" ensure the real political decisions, as some continue to believe. The PD congress elects the leader who is responsible for building and guiding the government proposal.

Censors, both internal and external, accuse the "Schleinian" Democratic Party of lacking a culture of governance. But what, for you, is a culture of governance? For me, the culture of governance is first and foremost a sense of reality, a sense of history, a sense of limits. I hear and read Schlein's criticisms as if we were still in the 1990s, in the midst of the ascendant phase of neoliberal globalization, of the West's confidence in imposing its model on the rest of the world, of faith in the self-regulating capacity of the market, of the conviction that the public is always the problem and the private the solution. I ask myself: aren't those who today propose exactly the same recipes as back then, in the name of a "culture of governance," displaying a far greater degree of wishful thinking than those who attempt to construct a highly discontinuous proposal? More than a culture of governance, in many of Schlein's criticisms I read nostalgia for one's youth and a difficulty in coming to terms with today's world.

The Democratic Party secretary has also been heavily criticized for opposing the increase in military spending to 5% of GDP . Is there an anti-American drift within the Democratic Party? Rather than an anti-American drift within the Democratic Party, it seems to me that Meloni is drifting anti-Italian. The 5% choice is unmotivated, irresponsible, and unsustainable. It is so from a military, geopolitical, and economic standpoint. The European leaders who, with the exception of Sanchez, bowed to this decision have cemented their irrelevance and subordination. From this perspective, the upcoming Italian general elections, in addition to the choice between public or private healthcare and education, between stable or precarious employment, will have another very clear fundamental distinction between the two camps: those who vote for the right will say yes to the choice of rearmament and cuts to social spending to obey Trump; those who choose the progressive coalition will prioritize the defense of welfare and the idea of ​​a more autonomous Europe, determined to play a role as a civilian power, not to contribute (even as a supporting actor) to the militarization of international relations.

The regional elections this fall will be the most important electoral step before the next general election. Aren't the Democratic Party and the center-left struggling to find candidates and reach coalition agreements? Today, the need for a united and credible progressive coalition, including at the local level, is no longer questioned by anyone, except those who are happy to serve as Meloni's second-in-command: both the vetoes and the illusions of third-party politics have vanished. I believe that everywhere, around the consolidation of the core of the PD, M5S, and AVS, there will also be a significant contribution from moderate and civic forces. Personally, I don't believe that local or regional elections are a dress rehearsal for policies, because local specificities always have an impact. The fact remains that for the past two years, when we look at polls and actual citizen votes, the underlying trend is clear: the right is losing ground and the progressive coalition is gaining ground.

Economic data, from the spread to the number of people in employment, seem to favor the government. Doesn't this risk undermining the opposition's arguments? These data don't reflect the real conditions of families and businesses. In the opposition, Meloni said she was concerned about local markets, not financial ones. Today, she's radically changed her stance, but some presence in local markets would help her understand the real situation.

Household purchasing power has declined in three years, wages remain among the lowest in Europe, employment is growing especially among those over 55 due to the increase in the retirement age, involuntary part-time work is on the rise, the number of young people emigrating in search of decent work is rising, and—a crucial and often overlooked fact—labor productivity continues to stagnate. This means that quality employment is not growing, but only in low-skilled sectors, such as tourism and some services.